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Case No. 20110066-CA-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

ISMAIL ABDULLAHI MOHAMED,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for Distribution of or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), -(4)(a)(vii), -(ix) (West Supp. 2011).1 This Court
has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Should the Court review an insufficiency-of-evidence claim of error
that was not preserved and was invited?
Standard of Review. An unpreserved claim of error may be reviewed for
plain error. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT4, f 14,128 R3d 1171. However, Utah's
1

Because the relevant portions of the Utah Code have not been
substantively amended, citation throughout this brief is to the current code for
the reader's convenience.
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appellate courts will decline to engage in even plain error review when counsel
has invited the error. Id.
2. Did the trial court plainly err in submitting the case to the jury where
overwhelming evidence showed that Defendant understood that an undercover
detective's solicitation for "some work" was a request for cocaine?
Standard of Review. Under plain error review the appellate court "will
conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the evidence
and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted/" State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18, If 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). If the court
concludes the evidence was insufficient, only then will it proceed to "determine
whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was
plain error to submit the case to the jury." Id.
STATUTE
The following statute is attached at Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2011).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND OF THE CASE
The facts of the offense
At about 11:00 p.m. on March 18, 2010, Detectives Steven Parisot and
Aaron Johnson of the Salt Lake City Police Department, both assigned to the
DEA metro narcotics task force, were working undercover on 200 South
between West Temple and 600 West. R130:55-58,105-07,113.
Near the shelter for the homeless on Rio Grande Street, "an area
frequented by a lot of drug dealers," the detectives found Defendant, who called
himself " Aii," standing on the street. Id. at 59-61. Using the jargon of the drug
trade, Detective Parisot asked Defendant, "Hey, you got some work?" Id. at 56,
61. Defendant said that he did not have any, but he would help the detectives
find some. Id. at 61. Detective Parisot understood from his training and
experience that Defendant's response meant that "he didn't have any cocaine,
but he would help [the detectives] locate some cocaine." Id. at 55-56, 61.
Defendant first directed the detectives to go to the post office because
"that's where a lot of guys are." Id. at 61. Defendant walked east with the
detectives on the south side of 200 South until they neared 250 West, from where
they could see that nobody was outside the post office. Id. at 61. Enroute to this
location, they approached several people, and Defendant unsuccessfully
"solicited these people ... for crack": "Hey, do you have some? Do you have
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some work?" Id. Detective Parisot acknowledged, however, that Defendant
never used the words "crack" or "rock," drug slang for cocaine. Id. at 56, 61.
The three then crossed over to the north side of 200 South and began walking
back west. M a t 61-62.
At the Jackson Apartments, on the northeast corner of 300 West and 200
South, Detective Parison noticed that a man, "kind of being passive," was
following them. Id. at 63-64. This man solicited several men sitting outside the
apartments, after which the men offered to sell crack if the detectives would
come up to their apartment. Id. at 64, 84-85. Fearful of being robbed, and
advised by Defendant that he, too, thought the men would try to rob them, the
detectives refused to enter the building and continued walking west with
Defendant. Id.
When they again neared the intersection of Rio Grande Street and 200
South, Defendant, followed by Detective Parisot, entered the Gateway Mall and
approached a Mr. Mohamed Osmond, also known as Ali. Id. at 64-65,78-79,86,
107. Defendant spoke for only five to ten seconds with Ali in a language that
Detective Parisot was unable to understand or identify.

Id. at 65-66.

Immediately after this brief conversation, Ali turned to Detective Parisot and
asked him, in English, "How much?" Id. at 66. The detective, holding a $20 bill
in his hand, said, "20." Id. Ali indicated that "he had the product," spit an object
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into his hand, gave the detective the object for the twenty dollar bill, and
immediately left the scene. Id. at 66-67,78-79,86. Detective Parisot was focused
on his transaction with Ali, and so he was not aware of whether Defendant
made any expression when Ali spit out the object and handed it to the detective.
Id. at 68-69. But he was aware that Defendant said nothing at that instant. Id.
The object later tested positive for cocaine. Id. at 67-68,104; State's Exhibit 3.
After the cocaine sale, the detectives continued to walk west on 200 South.
Id. at 68. Defendant walked right with them, expecting, Detective Parisot
opined on the basis of his training and experience, to receive a piece of the crack
cocaine as his fee for service. Id. at 68-69, 86-87,90. Soon afterward, Detective
Parisot gave the "bust signal/' and Defendant was taken into custody. Id. at 6970. About an hour later, Ali was located near 200 South and 400 West, positively
identified by the detective, and arrested. Id. at 71-72,108-09,116-17. The $20
bill, photographed for identification before the drug transaction and a large
amount of money was found on a Yasin Mohamed, who was walking with Ali.
Id. at 72-73, 110-12, 117-18. Yasin was given a citation for giving false
information to a police officer. Id. at 110.
Defendant did not testify. In closing argument, defense counsel noted
that Defendant was not a native English speaker and briefly suggested that the
evidence was unclear that Defendant had solicited others for drugs, as opposed

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

to "work," i.e., employment opportunities, and therefore Defendant may not
have understood what kind of activity he had involved himself in. Id. at 156,
159,163.
The proceedings
Defendant was charged with distribution of or arranging to distribute a
controlled substance, a first degree felony because the offense was committed in,
or within 1000 feet of, a shopping mall, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(l)(a)(ii) and subsection (4)(a)(vii), -(ix) (West Supp. 2011). Rl-2. A jury found
Defendant guilty.

R44-45, 62-64; 130:173-75.

The trial court sentenced

Defendant to a five-year-to-life term in the Utah State Prison. R121. Defendant
filed a timely notice of appeal. R122. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the
case to this Court. R128.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
L
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he
knowingly or intentionally arranged to distribute a controlled substance because
there was no evidence that he understood the detective's solicitation for "some
work" to be an offer.to buy cocaine, as opposed to a request for help in finding
employment. He raises this claim both as a direct challenge to the jury verdict
and as plain error in the trial court's submitting the case to the jury. In his
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motion for a directed verdict, however, Defendant did not raise the argument he
now urges on appeal. Therefore, Defendant's direct challenge to the jury verdict
is not preserved for appeal, and the Court should decline to consider it.
The Court should also decline to review Defendant's insufficiency claim
for plain error. In moving for a directed verdict, Defendant not only failed to
alert the trial court to the argument he now raises on appeal, he also directed the
court to only consider that it was his drug sales-contact, and not him, who was
culpable, a distinctly different ground than urged on appeal. Thus, because
Defendant invited any error, the Court should decline to consider Defendant's
plain error argument.
II.
Even considering considering Defendant's claims on the merits,
Defendant cannot satisfy either the demanding plain error standard or a simple
sufficiency analysis in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Defendant claims the State failed to dispel the possibility that he
misunderstood the defective's solicitation. But the transaction that Defendant
arranged belies the claim. Immediately after, Defendant spoke with "All,"
assertedly to find the detective's employment, Ali asked the detective, "How
much?" and spit out a package of cocaine and exchanged it for the officer's $20
bill. Moreover, Defendant's activity after the detectives approached him—
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asking other persons for "some work," protecting the officers from the
possibility of being robbed by other drug dealers —as well as circumstances
revealing Defendant's doubtful credibility, only bolstered the inescapable
inference that Defendant knowingly and intentionally acted as a middle man in
distributing cocaine.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PRESERVED
IN THE TRIAL COURT AND DEFENDANT INVITED ANY
ERROR
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
arranging to distribute cocaine because it required a "speculative leap" to
conclude that Defendant understood the undercover detective's request for
"some work"'to be a request for cocaine. Aplt. Br. at 7-13. Alternatively,
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in submitting the
case to the jury. Aplt. Br. a 13-16.
The Court should decline to consider the first claim on its merits because
it was unpreserved by Defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The Court
should also decline to consider Defendant's plain error claim. Defendant
invited any error by affirmatively asking the trial court to consider his motion
on a ground distinctly different than that which he urges on appeal.
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A. Defendant's daim is not preserved.
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he
knowingly or intentionally arranged to distribute a controlled substance because
there was no evidence that he understood Detective Parisot's solicitation for
"some work" to be an offer to buy cocaine, as opposed to a request for help in
finding employment. Aplt. Br. at 11-12. Defendant, however, failed to preserve
this claim, and therefore the Court should decline to consider it.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be
raised on appeal/7 Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If limiting State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313,
318 (Utah 1998)). "Utah courts require specific objections in order to bring all
claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to
correct the errors if appropriate/7 State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, % 14,54 P.3d
645 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). Thus, "[a]s a general
rule, to ensure that the trial court addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, a
defendant must request that the court do so." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 14. But
challenging the sufficiency of evidence on appeal by asserting a ground other
than presented to the trial court does not preserve the claim urged on appeal,
and the reviewing court will decline to consider it. See State v. Pedersen, 2010 UT
xA.pp 38, f 42,227 P.3d 1264 (declining to review insufficiency-of-evidence claim
based largely on alleged errors of inadmissible, prejudicial evidence where
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motion for directed verdict was instead based only on victim's exculpatory
testimony).
Here, Defendant did not preserve his claim that there was no evidence
that he understood the detective's solicitation for "some work" to be an offer to
buy cocaine, as opposed to a request to help find employment.
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Defendant moved for a directed
verdict:
MR. TAN [Defense counsel]: Yes, your Honor, I'd like to make a
motion (inaudible) the verdict. I believe that the State has not met
the burden to show that my client, Ismail Mohamed, was in fact the .•
one that knowingly and intentionally participated in the
distribution and arrangement of the sale of the crack cocaine. We
have heard testimony from, the officer; however, there obviously
appears to be some confusion and discrepancy in regards to who exactly
this Ali person is. And so, based on that, I would - -1 would ask the
Court for-THE COURT: • That motion is overruled.
R130:119-20 (emphasis added).
The motion in noway asks the court to dimiss the case because Defendant
misunderstood that the detectives were using drug-slang to buy cocaine.
Rather, the motion appears to suggest that only Ali participated in the
arrangement to distribute cocaine and that it should be granted on that basis
alone. Thus, the motion was insufficiently specific to bring the claim now made
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on appeal to the trial court's attention. Therefore, this Court should decline to
consider Defendant's claim, first raised on appeal.
B. Defendant invited any error.
Alternatively, Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred in
submitting the case to the jury. Aplt. Br. at 14-16. The Court should not
consider this claim, too, because any error in submitting the case to the jury was
invited.
A "party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that
party led the trial court into committing the error." State v. Maese, 2010 UT App
106,1} 11, 236 P.3d 155 (quoting State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9, 86 P.3d
742) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, 247 P.3d 774
(Utah 2011). "[U]nder the doctrine of invited error, [Utah's appellate courts]
have declined to engage in even plain error review when counsel, either by
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she had
no objection to the [action taken]." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, | 14,128 P.3d
1171 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The
necessity for an appellate court's following such an approach is obvious when
the consequences of the alternative are considered." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,
343 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert,
denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990)). "If trial counsel were permitted to forego objecting
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i

to evidence as part of a trial strategy that counsel thinks will enhance the
defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, were permitted
to claim on appeal that the Court should reverse because it was plain error for
the court to admit the evidence, we would be sanctioning a procedure that
fosters invited error." Id. (quoting Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159).
In making his motion, Defendant plainly requested that the case not be
submitted to the jury. In so moving, Defendant appears at first glance to have
preserved his claim for appeal. But as noted, Defendant moved for a directed
verdict based only on some aspect of Ali's identification and participation. In so
moving, Defendant not only failed to preserve the claim, he also affirmatively
led the trial court away from the issue of whether he understood that the
detectives had solicited him to distribute or arrange to distribute drugs, as he
argues on appeal. Thus, to the extent the trial court may have failed to consider
the sufficiency of Defendant's understanding that he was solicited for drugs,
Defendant invited any error, Therefore, the Court should also decline to
consider Defendant's claim under the plain error doctrine.

But even if

Defendant did not invite error, he cannot satisfy the demanding plain error
standard in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt.
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II.
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD AN
UNDERCOVER DETECTIVE'S SOLICITATION FOR "SOME
WORK" AS A REQUEST FOR COCAINE, AS OPPOSED TO
EMPLOYMENT, WAS OVERWHEMLING, AND THUS
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT HIM OF DISTRIBUTION OF OR
ARRANGING
TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
Under plain error review the appellate court "will conclude that the
evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime for which he or she was convicted/" Holgate, 2000 UT 74,118 (quoting
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). If the court concludes the
evidence was insufficient, only then will it proceed to " determine whether the
evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to
submit the case to the jury." Id. Defendant's claim does not survive plain error
analysis because evidence of guilt was overwhelming.
Utah law makes it "unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally ... arrange to distribute a controlled ... substance." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2011). "To be guilty of arranging, the
defendant must have committed some 'act in furtherance of an arrangement7 to
distribute controlled substances." State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, \ 9,3 P.3d
-13-
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725 (citing State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979)), abrogated on other
grounds, State v. Morales-Torres, 2001 UT App 246U. In the circumstances of this
case, the State was thus required to "show ... that an ... arrangement to
distribute controlled substances was made by the defendant and ... that the
behavior was 'engaged in knowingly or with intent that such distribution
would, or would be likely to, occur/" Id. at \ 10 (quoting Harrison, 601 P.2d at
924).
Here, Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that
Defendant "knowingly or intentionally committed some act in furtherance of an
arrangement to distribute a controlled substance .... because there is no
evidence that [he] ever actually understood the code word for cocaine." Aplt.
Br. at 11-12. Rather, Defendant asserts, "the evidence tends to show that [he]
understood the word 'work' to mean employment." Aplt. Br. at 12. Contrary to
this assertion, Defendant's conduct in the circumstances of the case
overwhelmingly shows that he acted with intent to distribute cocaine.
"Intent to commit a crime can be 'inferred from the actions of the
defendant or from surrounding circumstances.'" Hester, 2000 UT App 159, f 9
(quoting State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220,1223 (Utah 1983)). When determining
whether a mental state is sufficiently supported by circumstantial evidence, the
reviewing court asks "(1) whether the State presented any evidence that [the
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defendant] possessed the requisite intent, and (2) whether the inferences that
can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human
experience sufficient to prove that [the defendant] possessed the requisite
intent." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 21,10 P.3d 346 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted; alterations added). See State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d 594,
598 (Utah 1980) (holding evidence in forcible sexual abuse case that defendant
watched video tapes of victim forced to have sex with others made inference of
intent for sexual gratification "clearly possible (if not inescapable)") (emphasis
added).
Here, the circumstances surrounding Defendant's participation in
Detective Parisot's purchase of cocaine from "Ali" Osmond leads to the
inescapble inference that Defendant intentionally and knowingly arranged to
distribute the drug. Defendant approached Ali and spoke with him in a foreign
language, assertedly to help Detective Parisot find "some work/7 i.e.,
employment. R130:65-66. The conversation lasted "no longer than five or ten
seconds." Id. at 66. Ali then immediately turned to the detective and asked him,
''How much?" Id. The detective, holding a $20 bill in his hand, said, "20." Id.
Ali indicated that "he had the product," spit an object into his hand, gave the
detective the object for the twenty dollar bill, and immediately left the scene. Id.
at 66-67, 78-79, 86. As Ali spit out the object and handed it to the detective,
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Defendant remained silent. Id. at 68-69. The object later tested positive for
cocaine. Id. at 67-68,104; State's Exhibit 3.
This brief event is inconsistent, "in logic and reasonable human
experience/' with a request to help another find employment, as opposed to a
controlled substance. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 21. First, "How much?" is not a
rational first response to a request for employment, for no matter how much
work a genuine employer (or someone offering to help as an agent) might be
able to provide, the quantity of work would be meaningless without first
identifying what kind of work was sought. Stated differently, had Defendant
really solicited Ali for his knowledge of any employment opportunities, Ali
would have first asked the undercover detective what kind of work he was
seeking. Further, it defies logic and human experience that, after having spoken
with Defendant, Ali believed that the detective was seeking employment, as the
detective offered to. give him $20 for "some work." Finally, Defendant's silence
as Ali immediately responded to the offer by spitting out a package of cocaine,
mocks the claim, that Defendant solicited Ali on the detective's behalf for
employment instead of for drugs.
All the other circumstances surrounding this transaction only bolster the
inescapable inference that Defendant knowingly and intentionally arranged to
distribute a controlled substance. First, Defendant used a false name — "Ali" — to
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introduce himself to the detectives. Id. at 59-60. Then, after Detective Parisot
asked Defendant if he had "some work/7 Defendant guided the detectives to
several locations and asked other persons, including those who were apparently
homeless and generally unemployed, if they had some work. R130:82. Further,
the entire incident took place at about 11:00 pm in an area known for illegal
drug activity. Id. at 57-60. That Defendant truly believed in these circumstances
that the detectives were seeking employment opportunities, as opposed to
drugs, is not credible.
Moreover, Defendant revealed his familiarity with the drug trade and
interest in protecting his own drug deal when he cautioned the detectives not to
go into other drug dealers7 apartment because the detectives might be robbed.
Id. at 64. Defendant's familiarity with the drug trade was further demonstrated
when, consistent with the behavior of other middleman in drug transactions, he
followed the detectives in hope of receiving a piece of the cocaine. Id. at 68-69,
86-87,90.
Also, Ali was apprehended one-half block from the homeless shelter,
which is where the detectives first met Defendant and which is across the street
from the Gateway Mall, where the cocaine transaction took place. Id. at 58-60,
64-66, 71-72,108; State's Exhibit 1. Ali was then in the company of another
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individual who had a large amount of cash, including the recorded $20 bill, and
who also lied to the police. R72-73,108-13,117-18.
All these circumstances support the inference that Defendant was playing
the part of the facilitator in a drug ring working the area just south of the
Gateway Mall.
Finally, Defendant's attempt to bolster his claim based on his purported
limitations in understanding the English language ring hollow. Detective
Parisot's unrebutted testimony was that after he asked Defendant if he had
"some work/' Defendant indicated that he did not have any but would help the
detectives find some work; Defendant accompanied the detectives to the post
office where they would find "a lot of guys" who might be able to help them;
and Defendant both solicited others for "some work" and warned the detectives
about being robbed. Id. at 56-61, 64. Altogether, Detective Parisot testified,
Defendant spoke English throughout their encounter and was "able to carry on
a conversation." Id. at 85.
In sum, overwhelming evidence supported that Defendant understood
that the detectives sought to buy cocaine and arranged for them to obtain it. For
that reason also, Defendantn's insufficiency claim fails even if it was preserved.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted 22nd of March, 2012.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

^1

Vj^^^^V

KENNETH A. BRONSTON

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum A

)
U.C.A. 1953 § 5 8 - 3 7 - 8
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 58. Occupations and Professions
*ilChapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos)
•+§ 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 . Prohibited acts—Penalties

(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or
dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of any
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters
37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more
persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any
other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection ( l ) ( a ) with respect to:
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or I I , a controlled
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule I I I is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I I I or IV, or marijuana, or a
substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact
finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or
in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
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(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which
may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person
is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or
a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a
practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as otherwise
authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement,
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied
by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those
locations; or
(Mi) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or I I , marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces,
but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the
plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a conviction
under Subsection ( l ) ( a ) , that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances
not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including a substance listed in Section 58-374.2, or less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second
conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent
conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of
property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or
other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term
as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to
exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
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(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term
as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of
six months to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the person's body any
measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing
serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another.
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body:
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in Subsection
(2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule I I is guilty of a second degree
felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-4
(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony;
or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules I I I , IV, or V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury or death
as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-37-8 (2)(g) whether or
not the injuries arise from the same episode of driving.
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license
number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose
of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent oneself to be, a
manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized
person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to
obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to
acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving any controlled substance from
another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written
order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
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(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to
utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of
this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print,
imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of
another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to
render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter
who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah
Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier
of fact finds the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those
schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any
of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at
the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution
under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501:
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library;
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in
Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii);
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act
occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or distribution of
a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility
as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been
established but for this Subsection (4) would have been a first degree felony.
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible
for probation.
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(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a
first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is
guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This
Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g).
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law,
and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to
exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with the
mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests,
commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of
Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware
of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the
act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where
the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections ( l ) ( b ) and (2)(c), a plea of guilty or
no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a,
Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently
reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement.
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwithstanding a
charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this chapter.
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any
civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction
or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution
in this state.
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or
persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or
substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the
character of the substance or substances.
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the
veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or
administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an
assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and supervision.
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
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(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an
imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered
practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's
employment.
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as defined
in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona fide traditional
ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in
Subsection 58-37-2(l)(w).
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in Subsection
58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, possessed, or
transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the
practice of a traditional Indian religion.
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense under
this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than 10 days prior to trial.
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense.
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause shown,
if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice.
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to the
charges.
(13)(a) It is an affirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or administered a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if the person:
(i) was engaged in medical research; and
(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6.
(b) I t is not a defense under Subsection (13)(a) that the person prescribed or dispensed a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2.
(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person's body, a controlled
substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if:
(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a valid license to
possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6; and
(b) the substance was administered to the person by the medical researcher.
(15) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
(16) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that is less
restrictive than any provision of this chapter.
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